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Abstract 
Recently, theorists have sought to justify transnational democracy by means of the all-affected 
principle, which claims that people have a right to participate in political decisionmaking that 
affects them. I argue that this principle is neither logically valid nor feasible as a way of 
determining the boundaries of democratic communities. First, specifying what it means to be 
affected is itself a highly political issue, since it must rest on some disputable theory of interests; 
and the principle does not solve the problem of how to legitimately constitute the demos, since 
such acts, too, are decisions which affect people. Furthermore, applying the principle comes at 
too high a cost: either political boundaries must be redrawn for each issue at stake or we must 
ensure that democratic politics only has consequences within an enclosed community and that it 
affects its members equally. Secondly, I discuss three possible replacements for the all-affected 
principle: (a) applying the all-affected principle to second-order rules, not to decisions; (b) 
drawing boundaries so as to maximise everyone’s autonomy; (c) including everyone who is 
subject to the law. I conclude by exploring whether (c) would support transnational democracy 
to the extent that a global legal order is emerging. 
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Transnational democracy and the demos 
 “Let us imagine a society and then consider what form of government would be just for it”, 
Craig Calhoun writes to caricature how political theory traditionally has avoided addressing the 
problems of political belonging by assuming nation-states to be the basis of politics.1 Similarly, 
Frederick Whelan notes, democracy means rule by the people, and political theorists have large-
ly quarrelled over what “rule” should mean, while neglecting the other half of the definition. But 
“any democratic theory must face the logically prior and in some ways more fundamental ques-
tion of the appropriate constitution of the people or unit within which democratic governance is 
to be practiced.”2 This is the so-called boundary problem in democratic theory: how to delimit 
the political community relevant for democracy. Enter the all-affected principle, stating that 
everyone who is affected by a decision of a government has a right to participate in that gov-
ernment.3 
While justifying political borders has always been a matter as important as it is difficult, po-
litical theorists have recently debated the all-affected principle in the context of transnational 
democracy.4 Theorists favouring some form of transnational democracy often invoke this princi-
ple to explain why the current, nation-state-based boundaries of democratic governance are not 
normatively satisfying and why we need to democratise transnational institutions or transnation-
alise democracy. In fact, it may seem hard to imagine calls for transnational democracy without 
some version of the all-affected principle, as it forges the normative link between, on the one 
hand, the worries over how globalisation undermines democratic sovereignty and how increas-
ingly autonomous, unaccountable international institutions impact on people’s life chances 
around the globe and, on the other hand, the conclusion that we must build democratic institu-
tions of some sort at the transnational level.5 Political causes and effects no longer operate with-
in the safe confines of nation-states, this argument runs, and transnational democracy seeks to 
suture the widening gap between those who make decisions and those who are affected by them. 
However, while the all-affected principle may appear common-sensibly sound and simple, it 
raises serious problems as soon as we try to use it to set political boundaries. Addressing these 
problems, I shall argue, first, that the all-affected principle does not actually give any guidance 
for delineating a political community but that it does give some absurd recommendations if we 
were to try to approximate it in political decision making. Second, considering alternatives to 
the all-affected principle, I suggest that subjection to law provides a better criterion for demo-
cratic inclusion. However, I argue that this subject-to-the-law principle would shift the ground 
for justifying transnational democracy: To what extent are people subject to transnational sys-
tems of law? This turns out to be a contentious issue per se. 
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First, however, let me offer a few reasons why the all-affected principle seems morally ap-
pealing and plausible. For one thing, the all-affected principle seems to expound some classical 
democratic notions about autonomy and consent. Aristotle, for example, distinguished the self-
governing citizenry, “ruling and being ruled in turn”, as an element of liberty characteristic of 
good political rule among equals. Another oft-cited precursor to the all-affected principle is the 
maxim of ancient Roman law: “quod omnibus tangit, ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet” – what 
concerns all, all must discuss and approve. Both the Aristotelian notion of the self-governing 
citizenry and the Roman dictum imply that liberty means living according to laws that you have 
given yourself. We find a similar concern in the early modern theories of the social contract. 
John Locke suggests that since men are natural equals, “no one can be […] subjected to the po-
litical power of another, without his own consent”, and nobody knows better than oneself what 
is in one’s own interest.6 Likewise, Jean-Jacques Rousseau grappled with the problems of find-
ing a political form that would be consented to by its participants on rational grounds.7 For 
Rousseau, government is legitimate in so far as it reflects the general will of the political organ-
ism formed through the social contract – a will that every citizen is thus justly subjected to. 
Admittedly, neither Aristotle’s autonomy, Locke’s consent of the governed, nor Rousseau’s gen-
eral will imply or necessarily support the all-affected principle, but the principle resonates with 
ideals in these philosophical traditions. 
Secondly, the all-affected principle implies a defensive view of politics, where political deci-
sions and institutions inflict costs and burdens, if not damage, on people, as Whelan suggests. 
Fear of the Leviathan has been a strong argument for democracy: people have a right to partici-
pate in politics so as not to have their interests violated by those who wield the monopoly of 
violence.8 The all-affected principle seems to support our hunch to be sceptical of politics. 
Moreover, historically, it has been employed to support extending the franchise to groups previ-
ously excluded from participation in democratic politics. Transnational democrats often reason 
in a similar way: People affected – for instance, by global warming, trade policies, acid rain, fi-
nancial deregulation and other transnational issues – form the constituency of world politics.9 
Thirdly, we may associate the all-affected principle with relational conceptions of justice in 
cosmopolitan theory. The peoples of the world have grown together in a community, Kant 
claims, and thus “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”10 Some con-
temporary cosmopolitans likewise argue that we owe duties of justice to distant other persons 
who are not our compatriots because we are bound together by relations of interdependence.11 
And just as relations of mutual influence may ground moral obligations, one could argue, they 
can also serve to justify the boundaries of democratic community: Persons who are affected by 
decisions by governments and by other powerful actors have legitimate claims to be included in 
their decision-making, regardless of their nationality or citizenship. 
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Thus, there is a diverse pantry of democratic and moral traditions of thought that might lend 
support to the all-affected principle. And yet it turns out to be very difficult both to specify and 
to apply, as I shall argue next, presenting four arguments which, taken together, provide strong 
reasons to reject the all-affected principle, its intuitive appeal notwithstanding. 
Problems with the all-affected principle 
How do we recognise affectedness when we see it? 
As the all-affected principle does not itself explain what being affected by a political decision 
means, we have to complement the principle with some theory about affectedness. An objective 
approach to affectedness would require that we be able to specify, measure and assess the bur-
dens and benefits inflicted upon individuals by political institutions, policies and decisions. Al-
ternatively, one might hold that affectedness is a subjective quality. Let us explore both concep-
tions in turn. 
Generally, being affected by political decisions and institutions implies that some of your 
basic rights or interests have been infringed upon.12 Although not always specifying what being 
relevantly affected means, advocates of the all-affected principle often employ environmental 
problems as the epitome of situations in which the principle applies. Global warming, polluted 
waters, acid rain – these are the kind of contemporary cross-border problems that may affect 
other people than those who caused them. Thus, you are affected when something bad happens 
to you through no fault of your own. David Held, a key advocate of cosmopolitan democracy, 
could probably express such bad things in terms of “nautonomy”, that is, as being deprived of 
your physical, social, economical, political or cultural autonomy.13 But we could alternatively 
adopt, say, Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory of self-ownership as the relevant theory of affect-
edness.14 
Depending on which theory of affectedness we choose, we will arrive at different or even di-
ametrically opposed judgements. Nozick might say that forced redistribution of incomes violates 
people’s basic rights and interests, whereas safeguarding the sort of social autonomy Held has in 
mind would require an extensive welfare state financed through taxation. Different people will 
count as affected by the same decision depending on which theory of affectedness we choose: 
Someone is unjustly affected on the Nozickian account if he or she is forced to pay taxes for re-
distribution, but on Held’s account if he or she is not guaranteed a basic level of subsistence. So 
which theory of affectedness should we pick? These are the kinds of clashes of interests and val-
ues that democratic politics is supposed to be able to sort out in a peaceful manner. People will 
disagree about what it means to be relevantly affected, just as they disagree on other fundamen-
tal matters of principle.15 
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The all-affected principle is usually understood to concern burdens, but not benefits, an 
asymmetry which might follow from a sceptical view of politics, where democratic rights sup-
posedly enable people to defend their interests against government intrusion. And, at first 
glance, taking benefits into account seems problematic. Would a decision be undemocratic if 
you prosper from it without having had an opportunity to participate in making it? To take an 
environmental example of the kind that transnational democrats like to invoke, it seems peculiar 
to argue that an upstream community which has unilaterally cleaned up a polluted river has 
made an illegitimate decision solely because the decision making process excluded beneficiaries 
downstream. We could then qualify the all-affected principle by stating that only negative ex-
ternalities can be illegitimate, not the positive ones.16 
But real-life political issues are usually complex. Political decisions produce both burdens 
and benefits and distribute them unequally. Furthermore, once we start conceiving of political 
consequences in economic, utilitarian terms, we might also think of benefits and burdens as 
commensurable: A burden translates into a negative benefit and vice versa – that is, being de-
prived of a benefit is a burden and alleviating a burden equals a benefit. Whereas it would be 
difficult to keep separate balance sheets for benefits and burdens respectively, if we do take them 
both into account the all-affected principle, in turn, becomes difficult to apply. 
Moreover, how should we aggregate and weight burdens and benefits? Torbjörn Tännsjö ar-
gues that if we regard democracy as a method of aggregating interests, it would be more reason-
able to interpret the all-affected principle as a claim that everyone should have an influence pro-
portional to the stakes he or she holds.17 A graded right to participate fits the rationale behind 
the all-affected principle, since only then would an intensely affected minority be able to trump 
a slightly affected majority. On the other hand, grading people’s right to participate in decision 
making according to the extent to which they are affected would be at odds with the democratic 
principle of one person, one vote. In effect, it grants a veto to minorities with strong prefer-
ences. I think few proponents of the all-affected principle would depart happily from this basic 
principle of democratic equality.18 
Hence, trying objectively to specify the all-affected principle seems futile, because the prin-
ciple must be founded on some particular notion of what it means to be affected and such no-
tions are frequently matters of fundamental political disagreement.19 
So perhaps we should instead look for a subjective conception for affectedness, whereby peo-
ple who consider themselves to be affected by political decisions have a rightful claim to inclu-
sion. Michael Saward, for instance, endorses the all-affected principle and advocates a “‘subjec-
tive’ way of locating issue-based subject populations”.20 He suggests cross-border initiatives, by 
which a significant number of citizens can raise border-transgressing issues for referenda, and 
argues that innovations like these would actually better match the rationale behind the all-
affected principle than grand schemes for cosmopolitan democratic reform would. 
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A subjective understanding of affectedness could draw support from a different tradition in 
democratic theory. In Noortje Marres constructive reading of the debate between Walter Lipp-
mann and John Dewey, the affected come to play a role different from the one which they have 
according to conventional transnational democratic theory.21 Despite their differences, Lipp-
mann and Dewey both address not the subjects of politics, but its objects.22 Whereas democratic 
theory traditionally focuses on the persons whom democracy enables to master their own fate, 
Lippmann and Dewey are concerned with the issues of politics. In the complex, technological 
societies in which we live, the intricate objects of politics seem to constitute an obstacle to de-
mocracy, for how are citizens supposed to govern themselves, when the issues that they have to 
deal with are so complex and strange?  
It might seem easy to solve the problem that complex objects pose to democracy by either 
providing citizens with better information or by simplifying difficult issues so that citizens can 
grasp them. Dewey, however, contends that “foreign entanglements” and complex issues, far 
from constituting an obstacle to democratic politics, actually play a central role in getting people 
involved in politics. Strange, unfamiliar and complex issues are an enabling condition for de-
mocracy, and precisely because issues are difficult to resolve, we need to bring them out in pub-
lic view. Publics get involved in politics where existing institutions fail to deliver. Dewey sug-
gests that the public does not just spring up from nowhere: It consists of people who are affected 
by human actions on which they have no direct influence. People who believe that they have 
been affected by some such issue must organise themselves into a visible community: a public. 
On this Deweyan account, then, affectedness is subjective, and more an enabling condition for 
democratic politics and participation than a rigid, objective criterion for drawing boundaries. 
Furthermore, as soon as a group of affected persons form a public and thus becomes involved in 
politics, that group also begins to affect others. 
To conclude, subjective conceptions of affectedness properly recognise the reasons why peo-
ple take political action, whereas the attempts to find objective standards of affectedness imply a 
more legal-technical view of politics. On the other hand, the subjective approach also seemingly 
leads us to Joseph Schumpeter’s claim that we must “leave it to each populus to define himself”.23 
But Dahl famously argues that Schumpeter’s criterion makes it impossible to distinguish de-
mocracy from autocracy and that it offers no principles by which to decide whether somebody 
has unjustly been excluded from participation. 24 Accepting such a non-principle would seem to 
rob transnational democracy much of its normative force, as it would have difficulties explaining 
why current forms of decision-making need democratic reform. 
A vicious regress of constituting decisions 
A serious objection to the all-affected principle holds that it actually does not solve the bounda-
ry problem, because the principle creates an unsolvable hen-and-egg paradox. Since every politi-
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cal decision presupposes a prior decision on whom to include – a decision that affects some per-
sons – the principle leads to a logical as well as procedural impossibility, as Frederick Whelan 
demonstrates:  
“Before a democratic decision could be made on a particular issue (by those affected) a 
prior decision would have to be made, in each case, as to who is affected and therefore 
entitled to vote on the subject – a decision, that is, on the proper bounds of the relevant 
constituency. And how is this decision, which will be determinative for the ensuing sub-
stantive decision, to be made? It too should presumably be made democratically – that is, 
by those affected.”25 
Thus, when we try to determine the demos by means of the all-affected principle, we enter an 
infinite regress of constitutive decisions from which the all-affected principle offers no escape. 
Delimiting the political community is a political decision which affects people too, probably 
more than any decision that might follow once the community has formed itself. 
Moreover, once we apply the all-affected principle to substantive policy, we clearly see why it 
is indeterminate. In most cases, who is affected depends on what substantive decision the politi-
cal community makes; and the problem is not just theoretical.26 For example, a protectionist 
trade policy benefits and harms different people than does a free trade regime. So whom should 
we include in deciding which trade policy to adopt? Likewise, progressive taxation will affect 
different people differently than a flat tax, so who ought to be included in deciding taxation pol-
icy? Depending on whom we include in the decision-making process, we will reach different 
policies, and depending on what substantive policies we choose, we will affect different people 
who would have to be included in the first place.27 
Whelan’s regress argument demonstrates why the all-affected principle gives no guidance on 
how to delineate the community, a problem which proponents of the principle have difficulties 
addressing. Torbjörn Tännsjö suggests that we could get out of the logical loop by selecting a 
constitutional assembly of “founding mothers and fathers” to solve the boundary problem.28 But 
this solution not only disregards the fact that the boundary problem recurs on every issue, if we 
take the all-affected principle seriously; the solution also effectively excludes most of the people 
who are affected by the constituting decision from the act of constituting it. Similarly aiming to 
set up an institution to handle boundary problems, David Held suggests that “issue-boundary 
forums or courts will have to be created to hear cases concerning where and how ‘significant in-
terest’ in a public question should be explored and resolved”.29 That is, these new institutions 
would be given the authority to decide when, where and how the all-affected principle applies, 
including defining affectedness. As Michael Saward notes, Held’s proposal would vest enor-
mous powers “in unelected authorities requiring inhuman levels of knowledge and wisdom”.30 
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Furthermore, such institutional solutions presuppose that there is a correct and objective an-
swer to be reached – that these institutions, with which we entrust the power to solve boundary 
problems, can decide in a neutral way who has been affected and thus has a legitimate claim to 
be included. As the examples indicated above demonstrate, who is affected cannot be settled 
independently of the substantive decision. By giving independent institutions the power to de-
cide who is affected, we also grant them the power to decide on substantive matters as well. De-
pending on how these institutions draw the boundaries, different policies will result, and the 
practice of gerrymandering demonstrates why this is not just a hypothetical concern. Drawing 
political boundaries is always an exercise of power. 
And not only will different boundaries produce different policies, but also different interests 
among the people sorted into communities. While people might have a right to be included 
when their fundamental interests are at stake, what those interests are and how they are repre-
sented often depend on how boundaries are drawn. Your interest in migration policy, for in-
stance, will be radically different depending on whether you end up on this side of the border or 
the other.31 Again, the all-affected principle leads into a vicious regress. 
Fickle boundaries 
Whether we think of affectedness as objective or subjective, the all-affected principle seems to 
imply that we ought to redraw political boundaries for each decision that is to be made or, at 
any rate, that each issue requires its own functional constituency. That is, boundaries would be 
considerably fickle if constantly redrawn so as to meet the requirements of the all-affected prin-
ciple. Some suggest that this requirement represents a major problem with the principle, where-
as others see the resulting volatility of boundaries as desirable. 
Advocates of the principle seem to disagree on how far the idea of issue-based constituencies 
leads. The most radical interpretation holds that for every single political decision to be made, 
we first have to decide the relevant political community, that is, who is affected and thus ought 
to be included. Some theorists of transnational democracy nod in this direction and embrace the 
fluid boundaries following from the all-affected principle. John Dryzek, for example, argues that 
his account of deliberative democracy “can cope with fluid boundaries, and the production of 
outcomes across boundaries”, which, in his view, makes it such a suitable model of transnational 
democracy.32 David Held, by contrast, seems to think of redrawing boundaries by means of the 
all-affected principle as a one-off process whereby we shift authority to new but permanent ter-
ritorial layers of government, with regional and global democratic institutions added to those 
already existing at national and local levels in some countries.33 
Some critics argue that because the all-affected principle leads to political boundaries that 
are unstable and issue-area specific, it provides an impractical criterion of legitimacy for political 
institutions.34 Political boundaries could change from day to day and it would be hard to consol-
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idate political institutions. Even if we shift the tasks that states perform to new regional, global 
or issue-specific institutions, such tasks nevertheless require a degree of continuity, especially if 
they are to be done in a way that is democratically accountable to anyone who is affected by 
them.35 However, as long as political decisions have fairly permanent and uniform consequenc-
es, the boundaries drawn by the all-affected principle would be accordingly stable. Moreover, 
research on international institutions suggests that international problem-solving is often organ-
ised into specific issue areas that are all but ephemeral.36 In fact, transnational democrats could 
argue that just as the nation-state used to be a practical if imperfect shortcut to realise the all-
affected principle, so international institutions offer a decent approximation in our globalised 
world, where improved democratic participation could allow for a better overlap between those 
who make decisions and those who bear their consequences. 
Thus, while these practical problems in applying the all-affected principle might be overstat-
ed, we should worry more about what happens to the conditions for democratic participation 
once we redraw political boundaries according to the all-affected principle. Issue-specific politi-
cal boundaries might be feasible, but are they also desirable? Whether we understand the result-
ing political institutions to be overlapping, issue-specific institutions or layered territorial enti-
ties with broader responsibilities, the communities corresponding to them are supposed to re-
place the once so self-evident categories that nation-states sorted people into. Just as nation-
states would be replaced by an array of institutions claiming authority, so the sole citizenship of 
the individual would be replaced with a variety of affiliations with different communities of fate 
and choice.37 But what happens then to the rights, duties and belongings that territorial states, 
for better or for worse, have granted their citizens? Michael Saward argues that the protection of 
democratic rights depends upon secure and equal membership in a given unit. Applying the all-
affected principle thus risks taking away the very foundation of democratic rights without re-
placing it with something better: 
“if the constituency can and must change for each decision, then the rights of ‘members’ 
are not fixed, or immutable, from one decision to the next […] Membership is only se-
cure, because the grounds of citizenship and rightful political participation can only be 
clear, in a territorial entity.”38 
Nor would the rights of community members be equal, if people only had a right to participate 
in political decision making corresponding to the stakes they hold. Thus, even if the overlap-
ping, multilevel institutions and constituencies were to be stable and fixed rather than ephemer-
al, the rights of participation accorded to citizens would be tenuous.39 
Does the all-affected principle necessarily imply fluid, issue-specific political boundaries? A 
different way to abide by the all-affected principle would be to ensure that a given territorial 
political community, national or transnational, produces outcomes that are in accordance with 
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it. Instead of reshaping the boundaries of political institutions to fit with their consequences, we 
could reshape the political consequences to fit with existing boundaries, so that only those per-
sons are affected who are already included in political decision making. I shall now address this 
alternative way of fulfilling the all-affected principle. 
Unpalatable policy recommendations 
Thus far I have argued that the all-affected principle does not offer any clear guidance on whom 
to include in a democratic political community, nor does it help us decide on substantive poli-
cies. But as vague as the principle appears, other recommendations can be derived from it. 
However, those implications, too, I shall argue, suggest further reasons not to make democracy 
dependent on the all-affected principle. 
Hans Agné presents an interesting argument against the all-affected principle by trying to 
explicate the conditions for fulfilling it in a world of states.40 The all-affected principle has two 
components: to participate in making a decision and to be affected by that decision. For the sa-
ke of simplicity, if we interpret the components as dichotomous (as do most of the all-affected 
principle’s supporters), there are two ways in which the all-affected principle could be violated: 
If someone who is affected by a decision is excluded from taking part in it or, conversely, if 
someone who is not affected participates in making a decision. Such illegitimate exclusion and 
illegitimate inclusion are both ruled out by the all-affected principle.41 Obviously, the all-
affected principle is equally satisfied if you participate in making a decision that affects you or if 
you do not participate in making a decision that does not affect you. 
Interpreted dichotomously, the all-affected principle puts seemingly drastic requirements on 
democratic decision making. Even if we assume the state to be isolated from its surroundings, it 
seems difficult to ensure that nobody participates in making decisions without being affected by 
them or vice versa. Once we add the complicating assumption of a world of states, it becomes 
virtually impossible to avoid illegitimate exclusion and thus to avoid violating the all-affected 
principle. Even if a state interacts minimally with the surrounding world, some decisions that 
the state makes will affect some persons outside its borders who are not included in making 
those decisions. 
In effect, globalisation might also lead to illegitimate inclusion. Agné’s argument runs 
roughly like this: A community can avoid illegitimate inclusion when collective decisions con-
cern properties that all its members share. For example, if everyone is at least a potential tax 
payer and a potential benefactor of public expenditures, then we may safely include everyone in 
deciding on tax policy.42 The more characteristics people share, the more evenly will they be af-
fected by the decisions that they make. Thus, to avoid illegitimate inclusion, a democratic 
community must seek to make its members more uniform – economically, socially, culturally 
and by any other relevant dimension – so that nobody who participates in collective decision-
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making can shield herself from the consequences. In order to make the population less hetero-
geneous, fragmented and stratified, it seems appropriate to try to isolate the community from 
influx from outside, for to the extent that globalisation brings heterogeneity into a previously 
well-integrated collective, illegitimate inclusion could follow. Because the all-affected principle 
suggests that democracy can only be achieved in an isolated and homogenous political commu-
nity, Agné rules the principle out as an element of nationalist ideology: “[O]nly a nation-state, 
firmly founded on a mythology of unity and autonomy, can wield the social powers required by 
the [all-affected principle].”43 
Thus, a community that takes the all-affected principle seriously would have to pursue a pol-
icy of isolation from its surrounding world and internal homogenisation. This conclusion might 
seem surprising: We came seeking support for transnational democracy, but ended up with na-
tionalist, isolationist policies. Still, these implications of the all-affected principle are reflected in 
the standard narrative framing transnational democracy: Since globalisation has displaced the 
once so neat match between political authority and cultural, economic and social borders, theo-
rists of transnational democracy claim, we need to build new democratic institutions beyond or 
above the state as well. In so doing, we may regain congruence between the rulers and the ruled 
– a congruence which before it was lost always required a high degree of homogenisation, unity 
and cohesion. If we were to enact the all-affected principle at the transnational level, it might 
have policy implications similar to those which emerged at the state level.44 For example, identi-
ty politics in the European Union seem to reproduce nationalist ideology at the European level, 
albeit under a flag of post-nationalism.45 
Hence, for all their claims to shrug off “methodological nationalism”, transnational demo-
crats bring on board more of the notion of the nation-state as the locus of politics than they 
seem to acknowledge, as they premise democracy on a conception of congruence between politi-
cal and social boundaries. As it were, the all-affected principle renders transnational democrats 
just as rooted in a tradition regarding the political entity to which democracy applies as a closed 
circuit, a conception so appositely described by Walter Lippmann: 
“The democratic tradition is […] always trying to see a world where people are exclusive-
ly concerned with affairs of which the causes and effects all operate within the region 
they inhabit. Never has democratic theory been able to conceive itself in the context of a 
wide and unpredictable environment. […] And although democrats recognise that they 
are in contact with external affairs, they see quite surely that every contact outside the 
self-contained group is a threat to democracy as originally conceived.”46  
All in all, the problems involved in trying to specify and enact what the all-affected principle 
requires provide strong reasons to search for better criteria by which to determine the bounda-
ries of democratic communities. Next, I shall consider three such alternatives. 
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Alternative boundary criteria 
Procedures, not decisions 
So far I have argued that the all-affected principle is indeterminable, virtually impossible to ap-
ply, and leads to some rather peculiar guidelines for decision-makers who take it seriously. But 
should we actually take it that seriously – in the sense of reading it as a literal rule by which 
democratic politics must abide? After all, most normative principles are vague and ambiguous, 
and might lead to absurd conclusions if we try to follow them too rigidly. So perhaps we should 
not let the absurd implications that arise in concrete situations lead us to abandon a principle 
that might be sound in a more abstract sense. 
Gustaf Arrhenius defends the all-affected principle against such easy confutation.47 Alt-
hough the all-affected principle may be both impractical and unfeasible, it may still well be part 
of the normative ideal of democracy, Arrhenius suggests. We could cherish the principle as an 
end, although not as a means to that end. That is how rule utilitarians reason when they admit 
that attempting to maximise utility in each and every action we take could lead to absurd conse-
quences, but nevertheless argue that we should seek political institutions that lead to the greatest 
possible utility.48 Similarly, the all-affected principle might sometimes lead to absurdities if ap-
plied in particular circumstances, but nevertheless provide a standard by which we may measure 
the democratic inclusiveness of practically feasible methods of decision making. And even 
though none of these methods will ever fulfill the principle’s demands, Arrhenius concludes, the 
all-affected principle nonetheless helps us discriminate among better and worse decision making 
procedures. Hence, the all-affected principle would not guide first-order political decision-
making, that is, substantive, everyday policy decisions, but it might still help us make second-
order political decisions, which “are about first-order political decision-making, i.e. about 
where, how, when and by whom everyday political decisions are to be made.”49 
It seems reasonable to consider the all-affected principle not as a razor-sharp rule, but rather 
as a desirable if abstract ideal, applicable to questions of institutional design but not to concrete 
issues of boundary drawing. As a trade-off, of course, this abstract all-affected principle would 
lend less unequivocal support for transnational democracy, and lessen its intuitive appeal, if no 
longer applicable to, say, issues such as whether it is permissible to build nuclear power plants or 
perform atmospheric nuclear weapon tests near the border of another state. 
However, if we could distinguish decisions from ideals, this interpretation of the all-affected 
principle would allow us to escape Whelan’s logical loop, Arrhenius suggests. Instead of enter-
ing the infinite regress of constitutive decisions, we should simply concoct a theory of interests 
and analyse how different institutions would affect people’s interests – and then decide who 
ought to be included in those institutions. (After that, presumably, we could go back to demo-
cratic business as usual.) But who is this “we” supposed to decide on these important matters? 
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Who should decide what affectedness means and analyse the consequences of different political 
choices? These too are political decisions, and taking the all-affected principle seriously, if not 
literally, they should reasonably be made by anyone who is affected by them. Hence, we are 
drawn back into the regress, which Arrhenius fails to bring to a convincing end. 
Autonomy, not affectedness 
Robert Dahl has argued that given that a democratic process is desirable for a group of people, 
the values of the democratic process – where personal political autonomy is paramount – can 
sometimes better be obtained by changing the boundaries of their political unit, ceteris paribus.50 
Susan Hurley similarly endorses what she terms an endogenous approach to the boundary prob-
lem, according to which we can assess boundaries in terms of “distinctively democratic values, 
such as values of self-determination, autonomy, respect for rights, equality and contestability”. 
On this view, “some choices of boundaries and units and assignments of jurisdiction might tend 
to repress and others to foster the autonomy of individuals, respect for their rights, and their 
deliberative and rational capacities.”51 Thus, political boundaries could and should be evaluated 
in terms of their effects – not just on people’s interests, but on core values integral to democracy 
itself. 
The idea that boundaries should be drawn so as to maximise the values of democracy may 
suggest an alternative to the all-affected principle. This alternative advances on Arrhenius’ solu-
tion by replacing the indeterminable notion of affectedness with autonomy as the criterion for 
deciding the boundaries of a democratic community. This principle, which we could call the 
maximal-autonomy principle, requires: 
“that people be included in political procedures to the extent that their inclusion yields 
the greatest amount of autonomy to the greatest number of people, while accounting for 
both those whose who are included and those who are excluded, and accounting for ac-
tions performed both individually and collectively.”52  
Advancing this principle, Hans Agné argues that it would solve some of the problems he deduc-
es from the all-affected principle. The maximal-autonomy principle better matches other core 
democratic concepts and intuitions, and it focuses on a quality more central and well-defined 
than affectedness, namely autonomy understood as action capacity.53 Importantly, the maximal-
autonomy principle factors in both those who are included and those who are excluded by 
boundaries. Thus, the persons whose interests must be taken into account are to be found on 
both sides of the border once it has been drawn. This aspect of the maximal-autonomy principle 
solves the problem that borders by their very nature affect both those who are included and 
those who are excluded, a conceptual feature of borders that the all-affected principle cannot 
escape.54 Furthermore, factoring in both insiders and outsiders renders the demos in principle 
 14/25 
unbounded and global. In practice, the legitimate self-determination of each democratic polity 
is derivative of this global demos as a whole, as Arash Abizadeh points out: 
“The unbounded demos thesis does not, of course, rule out the potential legitimacy of po-
litical borders and differentiated jurisdictions. It simply confirms that the existence of po-
litical borders and their regimes of control require justification.”55 
Hence, by giving equal standing to insiders and outsiders, the unbounded demos thesis could be 
justified on cosmopolitan grounds. Andrew Kuper argues that a cosmopolitan theory could very 
well hold that the world should be divided into a system of sovereign states – but the existence 
of states must be justified, not merely assumed.56 The values of democracy could take place 
among the kinds of cosmopolitan values in terms of which borders must be justified on this ac-
count. 
While it might be difficult to imagine what it means to justify boundaries to an unbounded, 
global demos, and how such justification could be achieved in practice, the maximal-autonomy 
principle resolves some important issues following from the all-affected principle, such as the 
fickle-boundaries objection: For individuals to exercise their democratic autonomy, political in-
stitutions would presumably need to be stable and comprehensive, something which the maxi-
mal-autonomy principle allows for. 
But the maximal-autonomy principle comes with some peculiar problems of its own. Based 
on a consequentialist logic, the maximal-autonomy principle seems to open for some staple crit-
icism of classical utilitarianism’s intuitively abominable consequences. Classical utilitarianism 
suggests that it is morally right to throw a handful of Christians to the lions, if their pain does 
not outweigh the happiness of the cheering spectators in the Colosseum. Now, substituting au-
tonomy for happiness as the quality which is to be maximised does not allow us to avoid that 
problem, because the problem lies in consequentialism, not in the currency of consequences. 
Would it be legitimate to rob some people of their autonomy to maximise aggregate autonomy 
for everyone? Yes, it seems. The principle of maximal autonomy would allow us to disenfran-
chise or expatriate some persons to increase overall autonomy (on both sides of the divide be-
tween inside and outside). Not wanting to bite this bullet, Agné instead suggests that exclusion 
(as well as inclusion, presumably) on such terms is not compatible with his principle because 
“Political participation for the exertion of autonomy does surely not benefit from the fear creat-
ed by such measures.”57 
This retreat position brings back in a concern for the affected. Moreover, this consequential-
ist formulation of the autonomy principle also seems to remove boundary decisions from the 
ambit of democratic decision-making. Like the objective approaches to affectedness, the maxi-
mal-autonomy principle does not require that boundary decisions should be actually justified to 
those who are included and excluded. Instead, it suggests a criterion by which to draw and justi-
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fy boundaries. Thus, even though it elevates autonomy as the criterion by which to include and 
exclude people, this principle seems to be at odds precisely with the idea of democratic autono-
my. For who is to judge whether a certain boundary maximises autonomy? We can’t vote about 
it. Just like the all-affected principle, the maximal-autonomy principle would have to rely on 
some boundary court, constitutional assembly or law-giver to determine the boundaries. 
Against democratic consequentialisms of this kind, Jeremy Waldron argues that “any theory 
that makes authority depend on the goodness of political outcomes is self-defeating, for it is 
precisely because people disagree about the goodness of outcomes that they need to set up and 
recognize an authority.”58 That problem is not solved by the maximal-autonomy principle ei-
ther. 
Subject to the law, not affected 
As I suggested earlier, the all-affected principle may seem intuitively appealing because it builds 
upon core values in the democratic tradition. Democratic autonomy implies living by laws that 
you have given yourself and having means by which to assert your interests against the govern-
ment. A different way to express the congruence between governing and being governed is a 
principle declaring that “The citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all 
persons subject to the laws of that state”.59 This subject-to-the-law principle, as I call it, solves 
some, if not all, of the problems that follow from the all-affected principle. 
Just like the all-affected principle, the subject-to-the-law principle can be justified in terms 
of the general ideals of democratic autonomy as self-government or as government requiring the 
consent of the governed. In that way, it can be formulated to be compatible with both republi-
can and liberal models of democracy, and their respective concepts of law and participation.60 
The republican version stresses that the citizens of a state should themselves be the authors of 
the laws that constitute their polity, which requires that they participate actively, whereas the 
liberal version regards the right to participate in making the laws as instrumental to protect in-
dividual liberties and personal interests, a right that citizens may practice by electing representa-
tives.61 Indeed, the subject-to-the-law principle seems to make better sense of these democratic 
ideals than the all-affected principle does, since it does not take the detour over the troubling 
concept of affectedness. 
How does being subject to the law differ from being affected by decisions? The two princi-
ples do not necessarily overlap: You may be subject to laws that do not affect your interests in 
any tangible sense, and vice versa. As an illustration of this difference, Claudio López-Guerra 
suggests expatriates, who generally are not subject to the laws of their countries of origin, but 
may sometimes be affected by their decisions.62 Unlike the consequences implied in the all-
affected principle, however, being subject to the law cannot always be expressed as a calculus of 
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costs and benefits. Furthermore, laws normally specify to whom they apply: usually people living 
within a territorial state.63 For that reason, the subject-to-the-law principle offers no internal 
solution to the boundary problem, since it merely presumes that the relevant community is al-
ready determined and that there is already a state in place to maintain the laws and do the sub-
jecting.64 The principle only claims that where there is law, those subject to it have a legitimate 
claim to be included in its making. 
However, the subject-to-the-law principle sets clearer criteria for illegitimate inclu-
sion/exclusion than does the all-affected principle. We can easily think of cases when people are 
subject to laws that they have not even indirectly or passively participated in making, or cases 
when people participate in making laws to which they are not even potentially subjected. Such 
cases constitute illegitimate exclusion or inclusion, respectively.65 Moreover, given that it is easi-
er to determine who is and who is not subject to law than who is affected by a particular deci-
sion, illegitimate inclusion and exclusion seem to be more readily identifiable by the subject-to-
the-law principle than by the all-affected principle. Hence, the subject-to-the-law principle is 
more specific as to what should be democratically controlled, namely, the power to make law, 
but not necessarily any and all power to make individual or collective decisions which might af-
fect someone else. Furthermore, we need not fear the absurd policy recommendations that fol-
low from the all-affected principle, because law (ideally at least) applies to all its subjects regard-
less of their individual properties, even though law may affect them differently.66 
Thus, the subject-to-the-law principle seems to be less ambiguous and more applicable, 
while spelling out the same abstract democratic ideals that seemed to resonate with the all-
affected principle. If the subject-to-the-law principle is indeed sounder and simpler, does it lend 
support to claims for transnational democracy? Notably, the principle shifts the grounds for jus-
tifying transnational democracy: The crucial question now is not whether people are affected by 
transnational decisions or institutions, but whether they are subject to transnational systems of 
law. This turns out to be a contested empirical issue, with a diverse group of scholars outlining 
an emerging global system of hegemonic law or a world constitution.67 I shall consider such 
claims about transnational law, which in conjunction with the subject-to-the-law principle may 
seem to justify calls for transnational democracy. Considering them in detail serves to outline 
the content and limits of the subject-to-the-law principle. 
Hauke Brunkhorst suggests that we are today already subject to a system of “world law” or 
“global hegemonic law”, which “extends from the Lex Mercatoria to the comparatively fixed do-
mestic as well as supranational positive system of human rights”.68 Because the democratic ideal 
of autonomy requires that those subject to the law are also its authors and because people are 
subject to law that is issued by global or supranational agencies, democracy must also become 
global in scope, Brunkhorst argues. He lists a number of sources of global hegemonic law: bind-
ing decisions made by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, agreements 
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made by the World Trade Organization, the statutes of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the Council of Europe, international and transnational organizations 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, private organisations such as the 
International Olympic Committee, and intergovernmental institutions like the G8 summits and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which “have far-reaching au-
thority for regulating the entire global economy”.69 Brunkhorst argues that: 
“As a whole, the ‘network of agreements’ […] has led to a new form of international and 
supranational comprehensive jurisdiction [Allzuständigkeit], which is no longer the dis-
tinctive property of the sovereign state, but rather is claimed by a multitude of post-
national organizations, partly in direct competition with the states that are linked with 
them.”70 
Now, let me point to a few problems in justifying transnational democracy on the basis of this 
empirical claim. First, under the rubric of global hegemonic law, Brunkhorst includes interna-
tional agreements, statutes of international organisations, international organisations them-
selves, standards set by private, non-governmental organisations, and mere decisions and resolu-
tions taken at international summits or by the United Nations. By pointing to this vast, multi-
farious and pervasive body of world law, Brunkhorst can inflate his argument for extending de-
mocracy to the transnational level. At the same time, however, he also undermines the argu-
ment, for what is it about law that makes it so important for those subject to it to be its authors? 
Its character of being coercive, binding and enforceable on individual citizens, a characteristic 
not shared by most of the instances on his list.71 Moreover, stretching the concept of law to in-
clude these international institutions also renders the democratic requirements of the subject-to-
the-law principle unclear: we are back at being affected by decisions, rather than being subject to 
the law. 
Second, while international law proper has certainly gained in content, scope and importance 
over the past century, it is not law in the same sense as positive law within a state. Its sources, its 
enforcement, its subjects, even its normative and ontological status is different. International law 
is predicated on the recognition of state sovereignty. Thus, its authority depends on states to 
formulate, observe and enforce it, and it lacks an established compulsory judicial system to settle 
disputes as well as a coercive penal system. And while there is, arguably, a tendency in interna-
tional law increasingly to implicate non-state actors, such as corporations and individuals, its 
subjects and parties are still predominantly states. Even when international law concerns indi-
viduals (refugees or war criminals, for instance) it addresses states to enforce and respect its pro-
visions.72 And it is still exceptional that international organisations are recognised as parties to 
international law. Thus, international law turns out to be law of a different kind than that ad-
dressed by the subject-to-the-law principle. It is law of states, not of self-governing citizens. 
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Third, while international institutions have gained in importance too, they are not examples 
of global hegemony. They result from agreements between states. To the extent that they get 
implemented, revised, monitored and enforced, states are in charge of these tasks. Like interna-
tional law, international organisations do not imply the end of sovereignty but rely on it. More-
over, the tendency toward increasing juridification or legalisation of transnational institutions, 
that is, to express international agreements in a law-like form, does not necessarily imply actual 
law-making and law-enforcing capabilities.73 
The European Union, however, might be a special case, because community law has prece-
dence over the national law of member states. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has suc-
cessively widened its jurisdictional mandate and by the doctrine of direct effect, community law 
imposes obligations and confers rights upon individual legal subjects in the member states. 
Thus, by the subject-to-the-law principle, European Union citizens would have a strong and 
legitimate claim to be included, if only indirectly, in its lawmaking.74 On the other hand, the 
EU relies on national judiciaries and other governmental agencies of the member states for im-
plementing and, more importantly, enforcing its legislation.75 
Finally, coupling the subject-to-the-law principle with the thesis of global hegemonic law in 
order to justify claims for transnational democracy creates a problem similar to one we identified 
with the all-affected principle: The subject-to-the-law principle presupposes a sovereign law-
giver, the subjects of which have a legitimate claim to democratic participation. But the global 
hegemonic law thesis disperses the authorship of the law to a multitude of post-national organi-
zations, overlapping and competing with each other’s jurisdictions, as well as with states. Along 
these lines, some legal theorists similarly dispense with the sovereign law-giver altogether, and 
suggest that a legal system should not simply be understood as the implementation of a sover-
eign will, but rather as an autonomous system in charge of codifying the code legal/illegal. This 
holds especially well, they argue, since globalisation has undermined the traditional doctrine 
that legislation ultimately depends on a constituent power (the sovereign). The upshot of this 
systems theory version of the global law claim is that there already exists a closed, decentred or 
polycentric, autopoietic global legal system, producing valid legal norms: 
“The global political constitution is not produced by legislation but through decentered 
legal self-reflection and through a global community of courts, which ascertain legal va-
lidity and legal violations.”76 
Breaking thus the link from the global legal subsystem to sovereignty, this account of global law 
seems difficult to adjoin with the subject-to-the-law principle to support a claim for transna-
tional democracy. If laws are not made by an identifiable, sovereign law-giver, the subject-to-
the-law principle lacks a clear target for its claims about democratic autonomy. The subject-to-
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the-law principle requires a sovereign, a law-giver, something which these notions of global law 
deny.77 
Of course, like the all-affected principle the subject-to-the-law principle lacks a preference 
for levels. Even if hegemonic global law exists to the extent that Brunkhorst and others suggest, 
one might argue that the power to legislate should be brought back to national legislatures, ra-
ther than that transnational legislation should be brought under transnational democratic con-
trol. On this point, the two principles are equally indeterminate and would have to be comple-
mented by some claims about why re-nationalisation is either unfeasible or undesirable, or both. 
But re-nationalisation might be the more compelling alternative, since, as Dominique Leydet 
argues, we cannot expect that the “totality of addressees” of global norms will ever be able to 
exercise its sovereignty rights.78 
Thus, while the subject-to-the-law principle could lend support to transnational democrati-
sation, its recommendations are more restricted and specific than those following from the all-
affected principle. It does not justify sweeping claims for global democracy, but it might suggest 
that specific institutions like the European Union and other international legislative bodies 
should be democratically accountable to those who are subject to the laws that they issue.  
Conclusion  
I have argued that the all-affected principle should be rejected, because it does not help us draw 
the proper boundaries of political community and because it may have some rather unpleasant 
consequences if we were to try to approximate it anyway. Neither of the three alternatives con-
sidered here solve the fundamental boundary problem in democratic theory, but they all advance 
upon the indeterminate all-affected principle. The subject-to-the-law principle seems to be least 
problematic, substantiating a precise claim: that any already existing lawgiver should be demo-
cratically governed by those subject to the laws it issues. Thus, the subject-to-the-law principle 
might help debates for and against transnational democracy to get out of the quagmire of prem-
ising the project on neboluous notions of globalisation and affectedness. By drawing our atten-
tion to law and its enforcement upon people as the ground for democratic inclusion, the princi-
ple fruitfully opens up new possibilities for arguing about the boundaries of transnational de-
mocracy. 
Perhaps, though, these attempts to solve the boundary problem demonstrate that it is un-
solvable in principle: a community cannot lift itself by the hair and provide its own democratic 
justification. Of course, we can still solve boundary problems in both theory and practice, but we 
cannot always justify such solutions in terms of democratic principles. Chris Brown argues that 
the quest for a democratic legitimacy of borders is symptomatic of a wider problem, by which 
political theory is reduced to moral theory and all social arrangements are regarded as in need of 
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rational justification. But, as Brown suggests, we have no reason to believe that such justification 
is always going to be available: 
“Politics is about practical action in a realm where no answer can be other than provi-
sional, not about the application of formulae concerning matters such as social justice – 
and it ought not to be surprising that when formulaic approaches are made to subjects 
such as the legitimacy of borders the argument quite soon breaks down.”79 
Even – or especially – in an allegedly globalising world, borders are ubiquitous. Drawing, de-
fending and challenging the boundaries between inside and outside are among the most political 
of issues, and it is at best naïve to think that we could find some formula by which to bridge the 
gap between the people and its constitution and, once and for all, make the drawing of bounda-
ries uncontroversial and, effectively, apolitical.80 
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